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Neutralizing the Incompetent Voter:
A Comment on Cook v. Gralike
JAMES A. GARDNER

A

BOSWELL RELATES in his engaging Life of
Johnson, intelligence and conversational
wit were highly prized commodities in the salon society of 18th-century London. In that society, the playwright Oliver Goldsmith suffered from an unfortunate handicap. Though a
man of great literary accomplishment, Goldsmith, according to Dr. Johnson, was “master
of a subject in his study, and can write well
upon it; but when he comes into company,
grows confused, and unable to talk.”1 I suspect
that few would think to describe the modern
American voter in the way that Johnson described Goldsmith. Yet in a series of decisions
rendered over nearly three decades, the United
States Supreme Court has developed a political
sociology of voting that is distinctly Goldsmithian. In the Court’s view, voters are masters of politics in the privacy of their studies—
intelligent, assured, competent. Yet when they
venture into public to cast their votes, these
same voters become unsure, easily flummoxed,
and susceptible to suggestion—in a word, incompetent.
This model has led the Court to construe the
Constitution to create two entirely different
regimes of electoral regulation, one for the private aspects of opinion formation, and another
for the more public aspects of casting votes. Under the former regime, best exemplified by
Buckley v. Valeo,2 the Constitution essentially
forbids government regulation of the electoral
process when it is premised on the theory that
voters might become confused or be subjected

to improper influence during the course of a
political campaign. During the campaign
phase, the Court seems to believe, voters can
handle themselves. Under the latter regime, in
contrast, the Constitution turns out to be highly
protective of voters and solicitous of efforts to
shield them from attempts to confuse or improperly influence them in the polling place.
Here, according to the Court, the voter not only
may, but must be handled with great delicacy.
The Court’s recent decision in Cook v. Gralike3
extends and reinforces this dichotomous approach to voting behavior. In Cook, the Court invalidated a so-called “Scarlet Letter” law that required state election officials to identify on the
ballot any candidates for office who refused
publicly to pledge support for a constitutional
amendment imposing term limits on members
of Congress. The Court based this holding on its
belief that the ballot designation was an attempt
by the state to “dictate electoral outcomes”—a
result that is plausible only on the assumption
that it is possible to control the way voters vote
by the simple expedient of including on the ballot a single piece of accurate, though suggestive,
information. This assumption may well be valid,
but it contrasts starkly with the assumptions of
voter competence and independence the Court
seems to make in Buckley and other cases dealing with political campaigns.
I argue below that these two bodies of case
law may be reconciled if they are understood
to ratify two different methods for neutralizing
the effects of irrational voting, one applicable
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BOSWELL , THE LIFE OF JOHNSON 169 (Penguin 1979)
(1791).
2 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
3 121 S.Ct. 1029 (2001).
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to campaigns and the other to the polling place.
Even if irrational voting is an irrevocable fact
of contemporary electoral politics, electoral
outcomes themselves need not be irrational if
the effect of irrational votes can be neutralized
by distributing them evenly among the candidates. During a long campaign in which all candidates campaign hard for the votes of rational
and irrational voters alike, it may be plausible
to expect that irrational voters will distribute
themselves among the candidates approximately evenly, thereby neutralizing their impact on the outcome of the election. However,
when candidates appeal to irrational voters in
the polling place, other candidates have no opportunity to make counter-appeals, raising the
possibility that some candidates will gain decisive windfalls of irrational votes. Because, on
this view, irrational voters cannot easily harm
the electoral process during the campaign
phase, there is no great need to regulate their
exposure to campaign information. Conversely, such voters can harm the process when
influenced at the polling place, thereby justifying careful regulation of the presentation of information in that setting.
VOTING BEHAVIOR IN THE COURT
The Buckley tradition
Buckley has had such a monumental impact on
election law for so long that it is easy to forget
what Congress was originally trying to accomplish with the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA). Buckley has come to stand for the proposition that the main congressional goal in limiting campaign spending was to minimize the possibility of quid pro quo corruption of elected
officials. Yet that was only one goal of the legislation, and a secondary goal at that. Congress’
main concern in enacting FECA was its conviction that the influx into the campaign process of
large amounts of money was causing voters to
vote, and elections to be decided, for improper
reasons. As one report accompanying an early
draft of FECA put it, “candidates [should be]
competing for votes of the electorate on their
merits rather than on the basis of exposure as in
the case of such commodities as toothpaste, soft
drinks and beer, aspirin and razor blades.”4 On
the Senate floor, Senator Muskie defended the

proposed legislation on the ground that “millions are spent to sweep men into office on a
wave of superficial advertising more appropriate to soap or cereal than national politics.”5
What these and many other comments 6 reveal is a deep congressional fear that campaign
money plays a significant and improper role in
determining the way people vote. By limiting
campaign expenditures in FECA, Congress expressed a belief that voters do not always vote
rationally—on the basis of a careful, detached,
intelligent review of all pertinent information.
Instead, voters, or at least some voters, often
decide how to vote among candidates for political office in the same way that they decide
what toothpaste to buy: without conscious reflection, on the basis of superficial or improper
criteria, or in response to the sheer weight of
repeated exposure to advertising. It is less clear
whether Congress thought that unlimited campaign spending created an irrational voting
problem where none had previously existed,
exacerbated an existing problem, or simply allowed the better-financed candidate to attract
more irrational votes. Either way, Congress obviously felt that equalizing the amount of
money available to candidates would improve
the rationality of the electoral process.
The Court’s response to this theory is notorious. Treating political spending as a form of
speech, the Court, in language worthy of Milton, cast out the incompetent voter rationale
from the pantheon of legitimate justifications for
regulating electoral processes: “the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others,” thundered the Court,
“is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”7 In
subsequent cases, the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts have construed this language to
establish a virtually irrebuttable presumption
that in election campaigns more information is
always good. This presumption holds regardless of the identity or interests of the speaker;8
4

H.R. REP . N O . 565, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971).
117 CONG . REC . 29,321 (1971).
6
See also id. at 29,322 (Sen. Talmadge), 30,072 (Sen. Hart),
42,063 (Rep. Staggers), 42,056 (Rep. Madden), 42,068 (Rep.
Conte), 42,072 (Rep. Thompson), and 42,076 (Rep. Ichord).
7 424 U.S. at 48–49.
8 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978).
5
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regardless of whether the information is misleading,9 or even false;10 and regardless of
whether the information might unduly influence voter opinion,11 or distort the electoral
process by artificially depressing turnout. 12
At work here is an evident assumption that
voters are both capable and exceptionally hardy.
They understand information communicated to
them during political campaigns, and can evaluate it intelligently. They can sift through the
available information, distinguishing the true
from the false and the good from the bad. They
can attach to each piece of information just the
weight it deserves, ignoring irrelevancies such as
slick packaging, pandering slogans, and the frequency with which any particular message is
communicated. They understand when information made available to them is one-sided, and
discount it accordingly.13 Voters, on this view,
are rational, competent, and self-sufficient—they
are paragons of democratic citizenship.14

PORT TERM LIMITS.” The Court invalidated
the Arkansas provision on the ground that it
exceeded the state’s power under Article I, § 4
of the U.S. Constitution to regulate the “Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives.” 17

Cook and the campaign-polling place divide
The Cook case. In Cook v. Gralike, a candidate
for Congress challenged a provision of the
Arkansas Constitution regulating the form and
content of the ballot to be used in elections for
federal offices. After the Supreme Court held in
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton15 that members
of Congress could be subjected to mandatory
term limits only upon amendment of the United
States Constitution, advocacy groups supporting term limits began to devote their energies to
building support for such an amendment. As the
result of effective grass-roots organizing, some
states adopted measures, usually through citizen initiative lawmaking, requiring candidates
for office to pledge to support a constitutional
amendment limiting congressional terms. Like
many of these “Scarlet-Letter” provisions,16 the
Arkansas version directed that the phrase “DISREGARDED VOTERS’ INSTRUCTION ON
TERM LIMITS” be printed on the ballot adjacent
to the name of any incumbent official who failed
to take a series of designated steps intended to
further the term limit amendment cause. Nonincumbent candidates were asked to take a
pledge to support a constitutional amendment,
and the name of any candidate who refused to
do so would be printed on the ballot along with
the phrase “DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUP-

9

Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
(three-judge court), aff’d, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
10 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971);
but see
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (suggesting
in dicta that calculated falsehoods, even when not directed at individuals, may enjoy no First Amendment protection).
11 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
12 The Daily Herald Co. v. Munro. 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.
1988).
13 The same set of assumptions sometimes appears in
other contexts. For example, in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
the Court upheld a state law requiring that women seeking abortions be given information about alternatives to
abortion, and then undergo a waiting period, presumably
for the purpose of reviewing the literature. The Court was
not moved by the argument that this amounted to a forcefeeding of propaganda that might unduly influence a
pregnant woman’s decision making process at a vulnerable moment. Instead, women seeking abortions were
viewed as rational, detached consumers of information,
much like the voters sketched in Buckley.
14 Daniel Ortiz calls such voters “civic smarties.” Daniel
R. Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert: Theorizing Political Personality under the First Amendment, 81 VA . L. REV . 1 (1995).
15 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
16 Such provisions have a distinguished pedigree. For example, in Conley v. Hardwick, 132 S.W. 140 (Ky. 1910), the
court invalidated the results of a referendum on the local
sale of liquor. The “No” vote spot on the ballot was accompanied by a picture of the Bible; the “Yes” vote spot
contained a picture of a snake crawling out of a whiskey
bottle.
17 Every other court to consider a Scarlet Letter initiative
also concluded it was unconstitutional, though the U.S.
Supreme Court was the only court to rule on Art. I, § 4
grounds. The lower courts concluded that these measures
violate the provisions of Article V governing amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. In reaching these results, however,
they shared the Supreme Court’s belief that such measures
improperly coerce legislators to vote to support a constitutional amendment. The measures were seen as coercive because of their likely effectiveness in influencing voters. See
Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1999); Miller v.
Moore, 169 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 1999); Morrissey v. Colorado,
951 P.2d 911 (Colo. 1998); Barker v. Hazeltine, 3 F. Supp.2d
1088 (D.S.D. 1998); League of Women Voters of Maine v.
Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. 52 (D. Me. 1997); Donovan v. Priest,
931 S.W.2d 119 (Ark. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997);
In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1996);
Opinion of the Justices, 673 A.2d 693 (Me. 1996). In contrast,
the Idaho Supreme Court struck down such a law on the
ground that it violated the Speech and Debate Clause and
infringed upon protected First Amendment speech rights
of candidates. In re Simpson v. Cenarrusa, 944 P.2d 1372
(Idaho 1997).
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At first glance, Cook and Buckley seem similar. Both seem to prohibit government interference with the process by which voters formulate and officially express their political
inclinations. At a deeper level, however, the
two cases are very different, as the Court’s reasoning in Cook reveals. The main difficulty with
the Arkansas ballot regulation, the Court explained, is that Arkansas had improperly used
its power to regulate elections to “ ‘dictate electoral outcomes.’ ”18 The provision did so by
disfavoring candidates who oppose term limits. The ballot labels, said the Court, impose
“substantial political risk” on candidates who
fail to comply.19 The Arkansas provision also
contained another flaw: “ ‘by directing the citizen’s attention to the single consideration’ of
the candidates’ fidelity to term limits, the labels
imply that the issue is ‘an important—perhaps
paramount—consideration in the citizen’s
choice, which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot’ against candidates
branded as unfaithful.”20
In light of Buckley, this reasoning is startling
and, if Buckley’s assumptions are well-founded,
unconvincing. If voters are smart enough and
savvy enough to weigh and evaluate the mass
of information communicated to them during a
congressional campaign, how is it possible that
the presentation of one additional piece of information on the ballot—a piece of information,
moreover, that the informed voter would surely
already know—”dictate” any voter’s vote? One
might have thought that under Buckley, providing information to voters during an election
should be deemed an unqualified good.21 The
competent, informed voter sketched in Buckley
will take the information on the ballot for whatever it is worth—not much, presumably—and
go about his or her business. At the very least,
Cook seems to readmit a proposition that Buckley sought to banish from the constitutional analysis: the idea that providing information to voters during an election is capable of coercing their
votes, thereby controlling electoral outcomes.
The fact that the ballot labels deal with only
a single piece of information also seems, in light
of Buckley, of little relevance. Much and perhaps most political speech draws voters’ attention to a single issue, especially when it is
repeated over and over. Such appeals during
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campaigns certainly may and probably do “decisively influence” citizens in their voting decisions, but Buckley views this as inconsequential. Moreover, the subject to which the
Arkansas ballot labels draw the voter’s attention is an entirely legitimate basis for political
decision making. This distinguishes Cook from
Anderson v. Martin,22 in which the Court struck
down a state law requiring that the race of each
candidate be printed on the ballot. It is one
thing to invite voters to vote on the basis of
race, a constitutionally suspect characteristic,
and another thing altogether to suggest that
they consider a mainstream, legitimately contested political issue.
The Court’s reasoning also fails to distinguish the ballot labels from other information
that is routinely and, one assumes, uncontroversially provided on the ballot. Most ballots
identify the political party to which candidates
belong. A candidate’s party affiliation is a single piece of information to which the state
draws voters’ attention by printing it on the
ballot. Indeed, listing party affiliation is merely
a shorthand way of listing a bundle of policy
commitments held by the affiliated candidate.
This makes it unlikely that the defect in the
Arkansas ballot label law could have been the
sin of providing information on the ballot
about candidates’ substantive positions. Moreover, party affiliation is also a piece of infor-

18

121 S.Ct. at 1038, quoting U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at
833–34.
19 Id. at 1039.
20 Id., quoting Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).
21 In a recent article, Beth Garrett offers a theoretical defense of ballot labels on the ground that they may provide useful information to voters, although she concludes
that such labels are in practice too susceptible to manipulation. Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of “Informed Voter” Ballot Notations, 85 VA . L. REV . 1533 (1999).
Garrett’s theoretical defense, however, relies on a Downsian model of voting behavior in which voters rationally
limit their intake of campaign information, relying primarily on a few useful cues and heuristics such as party
affiliation and incumbency. This is a very different model
than the Court uses in Buckley, for if the Court thought
voters behaved according to the Downsian model, there
would be little need for it so aggressively to protect voters’ access to unlimited campaign information. Garrett’s
approach, which acknowledges the possibility of unfair
manipulation of voting cues, thus better explains the outcome in Cook than in Buckley.
22 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
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mation that has a great capacity to “dictate electoral outcomes.” There are many jurisdictions
in which having the word “Democrat” or “Republican” printed next to one’s name all but
guarantees electoral defeat. Yet it seems clear
that no candidate could successfully object to a
state law requiring disclosure on the ballot of
party affiliation.
If the defect in Cook was that the ballot only
contained information on a single issue position taken by the candidates, we might wonder
whether Arkansas could cure the defect by listing candidates’ positions on three or four other
issues. The answer to this question is of no
small importance. The Court’s decision in Bush
v. Gore23 renewed interest nationwide in developing more sophisticated voting technology. Computerized voting systems could easily allow the ballot to contain links to campaign
literature, permitting voters to browse pertinent information right in the voting booth. Indeed, it is difficult to see how doing so would
be any different from providing voters with an
official voter information pamphlet, as California has long done without encountering any serious constitutional difficulties. Buckley suggests in the strongest possible terms that all
information provided to voters improves the
political decision making process,24 and it is
difficult on that assumption to see the precise
problem with the Arkansas law invalidated in
Cook.
One additional possibility is suggested by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence. According to the Chief Justice, one of the main
vices of the Arkansas ballot labels is that they
appear on the ballot, which is “the last thing
the voter sees before he makes his choice.” The
problem with this arrangement is that “[t]he
candidates who are thus singled out have no
means of replying to their designation which
would be equally effective with the voter.”25
This argument is undoubtedly correct—but
only on assumptions very different from those
made in Buckley, an opinion to which the Chief
Justice seems otherwise deeply committed.26
Under the reasoning of Buckley, it is simply
incorrect to say that candidates have no opportunity to reply to information about their
position on term limits. They have the entire
campaign period in which to discuss and de-

fend their positions on this and any other issue. It is true that candidates have no opportunity to reply to voters in the voting booth, but
Buckley voters would not be influenced in any
way as a result. Buckley voters will doubtless
have determined for themselves during the
campaign what importance to attach to term
limits as an election issue, what they think of
the candidates’ positions on term limits, and
how that will affect their votes. Such voters will
take the ballot designation for what it is
worth—nothing—and vote their inclinations
anyway. The Court, it should also be noted,
had no trouble in Mills v. Alabama27 striking
down a state law prohibiting newspapers from
publishing editorials endorsing candidates on
election day. The state defended the law on precisely the same grounds as Chief Justice Rehnquist invoked in Cook: that it protected candidates from damaging election-related attacks
under circumstances precluding any possibility of reply.
Protection of voters at the polling place. In
a substantial body of cases dealing with elections, Cook is only the third case, along with Anderson v. Martin and Burson v. Freeman,28 in
which the Court has authorized the suppression of accurate political information during an
election. That seems to bring it into tension
with the Buckley line of cases. Nevertheless,
Cook fits comfortably into another line of cases,
one evincing consistent judicial concern with

23

121 S.Ct. 525 (2000).
See Ortiz, supra note 14, at 13 (according to such a reading of Buckley, “money is to be celebrated because it gets
more information and more ideas out to voters”).
25 121 S.Ct. at 1042.
26 For example, he voted with the majority in Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000),
declining to join Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Scalia,
who called for overruling Buckley’s upholding of contribution limits. On the other hand, he has consistently approved of restrictions on corporate expenditures, which
Buckley viewed suspiciously, dissenting in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), and joining the majority in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
27 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
28 504 U.S. 191 (1992). In Burson, the Court sustained a
state law barring electioneering within one hundred feet
of the polling place.
24
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improper influence on voters at the polling
place. In these cases, federal courts have repeatedly construed the Constitution to permit
state regulation designed to protect voters from
confusion and other improper influences to
which they may be subjected in the act of voting itself.
This body of law seems to have its genesis in
early government responses to violence and
outright fraud at the polling place. In the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth,
elections were not infrequently bloody affairs.
Physical threats sometimes kept voters from attempting to vote at all, or coerced them into
voting in a particular way. Following Reconstruction, much of this violence was directed
against blacks attempting to exercise their
newly granted political rights. In the Enforcement Act of 1870,29 intended to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress prohibited the
use of force, bribery, threats and intimidation
to interfere with voting at federal elections. In
a series of opinions beginning in 1879,30 the
Court sustained these and similar provisions as
appropriate exercises of congressional power
to protect the integrity of elections.
Legislative attention to the voting process
soon broadened once the most immediate
problems of overt violence were adequately
controlled. The Progressives, in particular,
were deeply concerned with the ability of democratic citizens to make intelligent and rational
political decisions, and they saw violence as
only the most obvious manifestation of a more
general threat to intelligent self-governance
posed by various kinds of illicit influences and
voter confusion. For example, Progressives instituted an extremely successful nationwide
campaign against the long ballot, which they
believed to be so unwieldy and confusing as to
tax the abilities of even the most competent citizens. As a result, all states now have elaborate
ballot access laws that significantly restrict the
ability of candidates for public office to appear
on the official ballot. Although it has scrutinized such restrictions with care, the Supreme
Court has consistently endorsed the proposition that preventing voter confusion is a governmental interest of the highest order. 31
Having been denied the most direct and effective methods of improperly influencing elec-
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tions, those seeking unfair electoral advantage
inevitably turned to more subtle measures.
Legislative responses did not lag far behind.
The offense of electioneering, aimed originally
at inhibiting outright intimidation of voters,
gradually broadened to include any kind of
electoral campaigning in the vicinity of the
polling place. Today, the proscription includes
activity that would be indisputably legitimate
if carried on anywhere else, even if it is peaceful, wholly unthreatening, and involves nothing more than the communication of information. For example, many electioneering statutes
prohibit the placing of posters or the distribution of campaign literature in the polling place.
Intimidation has largely disappeared as an element of the crime.
In Burson v. Freeman,32 the Supreme Court
ruled that these kinds of electioneering statutes
do not violate the First Amendment. The Court
took pains in Burson to try to place its decision
within the tradition of cases upholding legislative measures to control “voter intimidation
and election fraud.”33 Yet the Tennessee electioneering statute before the Court banned not
only “the solicitation of votes” within 100 feet
of the polls, but also “the display of campaign
posters, signs or other campaign materials.”34
Clearly, there is no possibility that a campaign
poster hung in the polling place can intimidate
or defraud a voter.
The Court tipped its hand much more clearly
when it observed that even though it takes only
about 15 seconds to walk 75 feet, Tennessee

29

16 Stat. 140 (1870).
See Ex parte Clark, 100 U.S. 399 (1879); Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371 (1879); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); but see United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1876).
31 See, for example, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415
U.S. 724 (1974); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780
(1983).
32 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
33 Id. at 206 (plurality op.).
34 Id. at 193, quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-7-111(b). See also
Marlin v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics,
236 F.3d 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying Burson to uphold
an electioneering law as applied to the wearing of a campaign button in the polling place).
30

NEUTRALIZING THE INCOMPETENT VOTER

55

could legitimately decide that “these last 15
seconds before its citizens enter the polling
place should be their own, as free from interference as possible.”35 The Court thus recognized the obvious. The problem with most contemporary electioneering is not that it makes
voters fearful of voting their true inclinations.
The problem with electioneering is that it raises
the risk that voters will cast votes for the candidate whose name their eyes last happen to
light upon before they enter the voting booth.
Tennessee thus feared, and the Court agreed,
that last-minute campaign appeals in the polling
place have the potential to “dictate electoral outcomes.” Cook and Burson thus have much in
common. Indeed, the ballot labels at issue in
Cook amount to nothing more than electioneering on the ballot itself, and they receive the
same judicial treatment. Similarly, neither ruling is plausible unless it is in fact possible for
voters to be decisively influenced by these
kinds of random contacts with acontextual bits
of political flotsam.
Lower courts have gone even further than
the Supreme Court in recognizing not only the
possibility and potential impact of irrational
voting, but the many ways in which irrational
or uninformed voters may be manipulated by
subtle yet unscrupulous election practices at
the polling place. For example, a significant
body of case law has appeared prohibiting state
and local election officials from systematically
awarding the first position on the ballot to any
particular group of candidates, such as incumbents. 36 Cases invalidating this practice have
generally relied on political science research
suggesting that some voters who come to the
polls without any information concerning the
candidates for certain races will resolve their
confusion by simply voting for the candidates
listed first on the ballot.37 Some state courts
have also developed a body of law dealing with
the language of ballot measures, which they
have applied to prohibit measures from being
placed on the ballot not only if the measures
are worded unclearly, but also if they are
worded suggestively.38
Under this body of case law, voters get
treated quite differently at the polling place
than they are treated in their homes, during the
campaign phase. Unlike the hardy, rational

voters sketched in Buckley, voters at the polling
place are seen as potentially ignorant, uninformed, and vulnerable to illicit suggestion.
The Supreme Court, along with lower courts
following its lead, seems to view the voting
booth as a place of great potential danger to
democratic self-rule. Voters entering this danger zone either have not made up their minds
at all, or, if they have made up their minds, are
at serious risk of losing their determination to
follow through and vote their genuine preferences. In this environment, the state may regulate extensively to shield suggestible voters
from improper influence and confusion. Moreover, as Cook v. Gralike illustrates, the state itself may not take any action, whether deliberately or inadvertently, that might influence
these suggestible voters to cast their ballots in
any particular way.

NEUTRALIZING THE
INCOMPETENT VOTER
What explains this dichotomy in the Court’s
political sociology of voting behavior? Why
does the Court treat voters as hardy, intelligent

35

504 U.S. at 210.
See Koppell v. New York State Board of Elections, 153
F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1998); Sonneman v. Alaska, 969 P.2d 632
(Alaska 1998); New Alliance Party v. New York State
Board of Elections, 861 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980); Bloomenthal v. Lavelle, 614 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1980); Sangmeister
v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 939 (1978); Gould v. Grubb, 536 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975);
Bohus v. Board of Election Comm’rs, 447 F.2d 821 (7th
Cir. 1971); Holtzman v. Power, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup.
Ct.), aff’d, 261 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1970); Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969); Bolin v. Superior Court,
333 P.2d 295 (Ariz. 1958); Kautenburger v. Jackson, 333
P.2d 293 (Ariz. 1958); Elliott v. Secretary of State, 294 N.W.
171 (Mich. 1940); but see Graves v. McElderry, 946 F. Supp.
1569 (W.D. Okla. 1996); Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp.
1057 (D. Mass. 1976); Tsongas v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 291 N.E.2d 149 (Mass. 1972).
37 For a recent review of the relevant literature, see Joanne
M. Miller and Jon A. Krosnick, The Impact of Candidate
Name Order on Election Outcomes, 62 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 291
(1998).
38
See, for example, Boucher v. Bomhoff, 495 P.2d 77 (Alaska
1972); Thiel v. Priest, 28 S.W.3d 296 (Ark. 2000); City of
Newport v. Gugel, 342 S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1960); Guernsey
v. Allan, 164 A.2d 496 (N.J. Sup. 1960).
36
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creatures in private, and credulous, suggestible
weaklings in public?
1. Two-Stage Model of Voting Behavior: The most
straightforward explanation for the Court’s
approach would be that it believes that formulating political opinions and voting them
involve different kinds of competencies, and
that American voters generally possess the
one competence but not the other. Such a
view, if the Court held it, would certainly be
incoherent. It paints an unconvincing portrait of the voter, one all too reminiscent of
the Cold War–era film The Manchurian Candidate. Consider: Waiting in line at the
polling place to vote, the voter reads his local newspaper, including its editorial endorsements. These have no effect—or only
whatever effect their reasoning and persuasiveness justifies—upon the independence
or quality of the voter’s judgment (Mills v.
Alabama). Upon entering the voting booth,
the voter lowers his paper and sees upon the
ballot a message informing him that certain
candidates have failed to support a term
limits amendment. This message instantly
reduces him to a condition of docile imbecility, and he immediately rejects all candidates identified as term limits scofflaws
(Cook v. Gralike).
This is just not plausible. It is clear enough
that voters can and do become confused at
the polls; Florida’s experience in the 2000
presidential election with “overvotes”—ballots that were punched for more than one
presidential candidate—vividly demonstrated this intuitive proposition, which is in
any event backed up by substantial research
on ballot order and format. But there is no
good reason to think that voters display any
greater competence during the campaign
phase of elections. Nearly five decades of research by political scientists has revealed
starkly the degree to which the knowledge,
political sophistication, and reasoning of
contemporary voters falls short of classical
republican ideals. This research has been
aimed for the most part directly at the process by which voters formulate political
choices, not the consistency and independence with which they cling in the voting
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booth to decisions made previously in private.
2. First Amendment Commitment to Voter Rationality: A second possible explanation for the
Court’s dual approach might be that the
Court itself takes a more realistic view of the
nature and scope of voter incompetence, yet
feels compelled to ignore its view in First
Amendment cases because the Court reads
the First Amendment to commit us to an assumption of voter competence. It is always
possible, of course, that the Constitution
prohibits us from taking steps adequate to
manage real and serious problems. Under
the circumstances, however, this would be
a strange reading of the Constitution. As
shown above, the Court has issued numerous decisions upholding under other provisions of the Constitution government regulations premised on the theory that some (or
many, or most) voters are not fully rational.
It seems difficult to construct a plausible explanation for why the First Amendment
should require the state to treat all voters as
fully competent when the Equal Protection
Clause permits the state to regulate fairly extensively on the basis of precisely the opposite assumption. Indeed, the Court in Cook
construed Article I, § 4 to prohibit the state
from proceeding on the assumption that
voters are exactly as hardy and independent-minded in the polling place as the
Court’s decision in Buckley deems them to
be during the course of electoral campaigns.
This is simply an incoherent reading of the
Constitution, suggesting we must look elsewhere for an adequate explanation of the
Court’s approach.
3. Suppression of Speech as the Most Dangerous
Remedy: A third possible explanation might
focus not on underlying models of voting
behavior, but on the remedies that governments seek to invoke to deal with problems
raised by less than ideal voting behavior. On
this view, the First Amendment, like any
other provision of the Constitution, permits
a government to view voters as incompetent, but it treats government suppression of
political speech as more dangerous to the
electoral process than any other form of government meddling. As a result, government
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restrictions designed to protect voters from
confusion and undue influence during political campaigns cannot stand because they
necessarily suppress speech, whereas similarly motivated restrictions at the polling
place may be sustained because they merely
regulate the environment in which the official act of voting itself takes place.
This explanation resonates well with the
standard First Amendment presumption
that government suppression of speech is
bad, and perhaps it has influenced the
Court’s approach in these two lines of cases
at some level. As a justification for the
Court’s dual approach, however, it is unpersuasive. To begin with, it rests upon a
manifestly false premise. Government regulation of speech is far from the most dangerous kind of regulation of electoral processes. Danger, in this context, is a function
of the degree to which government action
threatens to control electoral results. Yet
government regulation of voting qualifications and ballot access, to name just two obvious examples, has a far more direct and
immediate impact on how elections turn out
than does government meddling with political speech. Regulating who can vote, and
for whom, can and clearly does decisively
influence electoral outcomes, thus posing a
far more urgent threat to popular sovereignty. Regulation of political speech during
a campaign has, in comparison, a remote
and attenuated impact on who actually wins
elections. If government regulation of the act
of voting is in fact far more threatening to
popular sovereignty; and such regulation,
though carefully scrutinized, is in fact often
upheld; it follows that government regulation of political campaign speech ought to
be easier to justify, not harder.
It might be objected at this point that government must regulate the voting process.
Someone must decide who can vote, who
can run, and how votes will be counted, and
the only possible regulator is the government. Consequently, at least some government regulation of these processes must inevitably be sustained. The same cannot be
said, the objection might continue, of political speech: it is simply not the case that po-

litical speech must be regulated. This argument might well be valid, but it rests on an
important assumption: that political speech
is not in need of regulation because it simply is not dangerous to popular sovereignty.
Both the argument in the preceding paragraph and this objection, it seems to me,
point us in a more promising direction. The
Court’s dichotomous approach to government regulation of political campaigns and
the polling place is best explained as resting
on the Court’s assumption that it is categorically impossible for political campaign
speech to pose any significant risk to the
fairness or integrity of electoral processes.
Thus, the Court routinely strikes down regulations of campaign speech because it is unable to perceive any adequate justification
for such regulations. In contrast, the Court
readily perceives the legitimacy of threats to
electoral integrity posed by behavior at the
polling place, and consequently upholds
regulations of such threats.
4. The Dangers of Government Electoral Speech:
Before further exploring this more promising avenue, I want to dispose of a variation
of the First Amendment explanation: that
Cook and Buckley can be usefully distinguished on the ground that the former involves government rather than private
speech, and that government speech in the
electoral arena poses special dangers that
justify its suppression. Here, at least, such an
explanation is unavailing. In this context,
government speech is capable of unduly
threatening the electoral process only on the
very set of assumptions that Buckley seems to
deny—that voters are incapable of judging
intelligently the accuracy of, and appropriate
weight to be accorded to, speech from any
particular source, including the government.
Buckley, of course, deals directly only with
voter susceptibility to private campaign
speech. But treating government speech differently from private speech would make
sense only if voters were somehow more susceptible to influence by government speech.
This, in turn could be the case only if one of
two things were true: either government
speech is inherently more persuasive to voters than private speech, or the government’s
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resources make it a potentially more potent
electoral force than private actors. The first
possibility seems false—if anything, the public seems to trust government speakers less
than private speakers—and is in any event
contradicted by the Court’s identical treatment in Burson of private speech in the polling
place. The second possibility, though more
likely true, is ruled out expressly by Buckley.
Furthermore, the government speech
analysis does not go very far in Cook even
on its own terms. First, Cook is a particularly
weak case to treat as presenting problems
associated with government speech because
of its content. In the electoral context, the
principal danger presented by government
political speech is the possibility that the
government will speak for the purpose, and
with the effect, of perpetuating its hold on
power. In Cook, however, the speech at issue—promoting term limits—was designed
to defeat self-perpetuation of the incumbent
government. 39 Second, even if the content of
the speech were treated as irrelevant, the
ballot labels at issue in Cook still do not present the characteristics that commentators
typically identify as raising the most significant concerns about government speech.
For example, the ballot labels do not communicate information that is unverifiable, or
that is within the government’s exclusive
possession, or that concerns a subject that either has not or could not be extensively discussed in the public sphere.40 Indeed, if term
limits are such a politically salient issue that
the people of Arkansas saw fit to convey
candidates’ positions directly on the ballot,
it is hard to imagine that these positions
would not have been raised and thoroughly
discussed during the campaign rather than
solely on the ballot. Similarly, the Arkansas
ballot labels do not raise the problem of government monopolization of speech markets
identified by Abner Greene.41 Although the
ballot is within the exclusive control of the
state, there can be no good justification for
treating the ballot itself as the relevant market for speech concerning term limits. The
real market would seem to be the entire public sphere of campaign speech in the period
preceding the election. 42

5. The Neutralization Rationale: Is it possible,
then, to fashion an account of the Court’s
election cases that explains its refusal to tolerate government regulation of political
campaign speech without also attributing to
the Court an unrealistically bifurcated
model of voting behavior? I think it is. Such
an account must turn on the Court’s apparent belief that political speech, no matter
how wrong, misleading or one-sided, does
not present any significant threat to democratic self-governance even in view of voter incompetence. In other words, the Court’s position is plausible only if the risk that
incompetent voters will be unduly influenced by bad or misleading information is
much worse at the polls than during the
campaign. As we shall see, this view is cynical, but also plausible.
Let me make clear what I am not arguing.
One reason why bad speech appearing during a political campaign might not cause any
damage to the electoral process is because
any problems it causes can be addressed and
corrected later in the same campaign. As a
matter of basic First Amendment doctrine,
the Court generally contemplates that any
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42 Of course, the ballot might well constitute the relevant
market for political speech for a certain kind of voter, one
who (1) reads and hears nothing before entering the
polling place, and (2) is susceptible to manipulation by ballot labeling. But this merely brings us back to a problem
of incompetent voting behavior rather than one involving
heightened dangers of government electoral speech. Or at
least, that is the case unless there is some reason to think
that some substantial proportion of incompetent voters are
more susceptible to coercion by public than by private
speech, a phenomenon that is perhaps possible, though
seemingly unlikely, and would tend to undermine the rationale for the Court’s holding in Burson.
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problems caused by bad information will be
rectified in the free market of political
speech. As Justice Brandeis wrote, “the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good
ones”;43 the default solution for bad speech
is more speech. But this reasoning does not
apply to the problem of voter incompetence
that the Court, in its polling place cases, has
acknowledged. That is because the counterspeech solution assumes that voters are
highly competent, for only a competent, rational, reasonably well-informed citizen can
be reached and persuaded by counterspeech. The remedy of corrective campaign
speech thus simply is not one that can be relied upon to solve the potential problems for
the electoral system caused by voter incompetence.

itself, as in Cook. When an appeal to which incompetent voters are susceptible is made on the
ballot, there is no opportunity for those who
oppose the message to counter with irrational
appeals of their own, whether directed to the
same or to different voters. This makes it more
likely that irrational votes will be cast in a single direction, in turn influencing electoral outcomes.
This is the precise theory upon which lower
courts have invalidated laws establishing a ballot order that consistently lists incumbents (or
any other group) first. Nobody claims that rotating the order in which candidates appear on
different ballots will prevent incompetent voters from voting for the candidate listed first on
the ballot. On the contrary, it is assumed that
voters so inclined will continue to do so. However, rotation of ballot order will more likely
result in an equal dispersion of such votes
among all the candidates, reducing the impact
of this particular kind of irrational voting on
the outcome of the election. According to this
reasoning, the defect in Cook was not so much
that there was a message on the ballot as that
the message was recurring, consistent, and focused on a single issue. The Arkansas law thus
decreased the probability of a fair and even distribution of incompetent votes. In a close election, this might be decisive.
If this account is sound, there is nevertheless
something disturbing about the inflexible way
in which the Court applies the underlying principle. The Constitution, in the Court’s view, apparently leaves no room for consideration of
any actual facts about voting behavior or the
mechanics of campaign and electoral processes.
The Court, it seems, has irrevocably decreed
that voter irrationality is not a constitutionally
cognizable problem during electoral campaigns because it can be neutralized over the
course of a campaign; and that it is a constitutionally cognizable problem at the polling place
because it cannot be neutralized in that setting—and that is that.
This inflexibility leads to some disturbing
anomalies in the Court’s approach to electoral

To address voter incompetence, it is necessary
to take a considerably more cynical view. Let us
assume that voter incompetence, in some unknown degree, is a fact of modern political life.
Let us assume further that nothing—including
permitting unlimited counter-speech—can be
done in the short term to prevent some proportion of the electorate from voting on the basis of
inaccurate, inappropriate, superficial, or onesided information acquired during the course of
the electoral campaign. Although irrational voting thus by hypothesis cannot be eliminated, its
effects can be largely eliminated by taking steps
to spread irrational votes as evenly as possible
among the candidates. Irrational voters can thus
be neutralized—taken out of the electoral calculus—by assuring that no single candidate or
group of candidates receives a disproportionate
windfall of irrational votes.
Over the course of a long campaign, it may
be plausible to expect candidates and their supporters and opponents to take all possible steps
to attract incompetent (as well as competent)
voters, and that these efforts will, given time,
result in a roughly even distribution of irrational votes. On this view, there is no need for
government to regulate political speech that
improperly sways irrational voters because it
is unlikely that irrational voters will align so
one-sidedly as to significantly affect an election. The same, however, cannot be said of appeals to incompetent voters made on the ballot
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regulation. Congress, it will be recalled, conducted its own review of the problem of voter
irrationality in electoral campaigns, and based
FECA’s remedies on precisely the kind of reasoning the Court applies in its polling place
cases. By establishing campaign spending limits, Congress hoped to eliminate large inequalities in resources available to candidates. Presumably, equalization of resources would not
in itself reduce the susceptibility of voters to irrational appeals; more likely, equalization of
resources would allow candidates to distribute
irrational votes approximately equally, neutralizing such votes and increasing the likelihood that federal elections would be decided
on the basis of substantive appeals made to rational voters.
The Court rejected this theory in Buckley, and
its default premise as I have sketched it here—
that unconstrained campaign spending will
most likely result in a fair dispersion of irrational votes—is not inherently implausible.
Still, it is not at all clear why this default
premise cannot be refuted by facts. If Congress
believed, and could demonstrate, that unlimited political spending in fact results in significant financing disparities; and that better-financed candidates consistently attract more
than their fair share of irrational votes; and that
these irrational votes influence election outcomes often enough to make a systematic and
arbitrary difference in favor of richer or betterfinanced candidates; it is hard to understand
why Buckley’s reasoning, especially in light of
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the polling place cases, ought not to permit a
different result.
It would be one thing if the Court read the
Constitution to dictate normatively some aspirational model of citizenship and voting behavior from which legislatures simply were not
free to deviate. But that is not what the Court
has done. On the contrary, it has freely acknowledged the very real problem of voter incompetence, and has construed the Constitution to permit that problem to be dealt with
flexibly and reasonably effectively in certain
circumstances. What is most disturbing about
the Court’s approach is that it seems to have
based its constitutional decision making in this
critically important area on a highly factbound, sociological model of individual behavior in the electoral arena, and then taken
steps to assure that its model is not subject to
contradiction by the facts. This is perhaps the
very definition of judicial formalism, and it
might help explain why, with each passing
election cycle, the Court’s adherence to Buckley
seems increasingly unjustifiable.
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